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There have been a substantial number of studies on the causes of the 1997 Asian 
financial and economic crisis and its effects on Korea’s economic development policy.  
Much less attention has been given to determining the effects on the environmental 
policy of Korea.  This paper analyzes the movement of various environmental budgets 
in Korea, i.e. budgets for pollution abatement and control activities and for the 
Ministry of Environment, before and after the 1997 Asian financial and economic 
crisis to examine its impact on Korea’s environmental policy.  Budget data was drawn 
from a number of sources, including the OECD, the Bank of Korea, the Ministry of 
Environment of Korea and the Ministry of Planning and Budget of Korea.  The 
evidence supports the hypothesis that the 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis 
negatively impacted environmental policy well beyond the immediate effects of the 
economic recession in 1998.  Spending on the environment in Korea expanded at a 
much slower rate after 1997 than in the years leading up the Asian financial and 
economic crisis, which indicates a cessation or reversal of the prioritization of 
environmental policy among policy makers that began in the early 1990s in Korea.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For most of the Republic of Korea’s [hereafter Korea] industrialization drive 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, environmental issues were one of the least important 
concerns of policy makers.  Instead, national priorities centered on economic 
development as an overriding policy goal, in particular on lifting the country out of 
poverty by increasing GDP.  For several decades, Korea’s decision makers devised 
policies that maintained high rates of economic growth at the expense of the 
environment and other issues.  When democratization of the country took hold in the 
late 1980s, previously pent up social forces quickly entered the political discourse and 
played a part in reshaping various policies.  It is in this context that the nascent 
environmental movement began to mature and press Korea’s policy planners for 
stronger environmental policies.  In response, the Korean government intensified 
efforts in the early 1990s to reverse the environmental degradation that had 
accumulated from Korea’s industrial expansion.   
By the 1980s, Korea was suffering from serious air, water and soil pollution.  
Rapid development had markedly scared the natural environment of Korea.  The skies 
were clouded by pollution from industry and transport.  The rivers and coastal areas 
were contaminated by innumerable sources of economic activity, including industry, 
agriculture, and construction.  Solid waste was becoming a serious problem as the 
nation became wealthier and consumption patterns changed.  There was recognition 
of the complexity of the situation as a multitude of other environmental issues came to 
light, such as dumping of hazardous and radioactive waste, loss of biodiversity, loss 
of natural habitat, etc.   
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Korea was beginning to make significant progress in cleaning up and reducing 
these environmental ailments when the Asian financial and economic crisis1 struck in 
1997.  This event shocked the national psyche.  Since Korea’s recent modern history 
has been defined by an ability to consistently generate high economic growth rates, 
the reversals of the financial crisis pushed other issues to the bottom of the national 
agenda.  Policy makers focused most of their attention and energy on economic 
recovery.  By 1999, however, Korea’s economy was in full recovery, growing at a 
rate that outpaced even the most optimistic estimates from just a year earlier.2   
Initially, environmental budgets rebounded along with the economy.  However, 
as the economy continued to improve, these budgets failed to grow at rates that were 
comparable to those of the early and mid-1990s.  While a temporary reduction or 
slowdown can be attributed to a crisis-period decision, a pattern of slower funding 
increases, significantly different than before 1997, indicates that Korea’s 
environmental issues became less important to policy makers after the crisis.  The 
significance of this observation becomes more apparent when noting that spending by 
the government on other services returned to approximately pre-crisis growth rates 
after the economy recovered from the crisis.   
Policy makers continue to publicly support environmental issues, but the 
financial backing for environmental policies after the crisis has not matched the 
official rhetoric.  An examination of the changes in spending on the environment in 
Korea in the years following the financial crisis will demonstrate that it negatively 
impacted long term environmental policy.  In particular, this paper will focus on the 
budget trends for pollution abatement and control activities.  Although these 
                                                 
1 The 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis will be referred to as the financial crisis or crisis   
throughout the remainder of the text.  
2 See Asian Development Outlook 1998, Asian Development Bank, 1998, pp. 46 – 49; Economic 
Survey: Korea. Paris, France: OECD, 1998; and “On their feet again?” The Economist. 19 Aug. 1999.  
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expenditures represent only a portion of environmental spending, these budgets 
provide a rough indication of the general direction of Korea’s environmental policy; 
in this case, they will help establish that the priority for environmental activities 
among policy makers diminished in the wake of the crisis.   
My analysis will show that the growth rates of the public sector budget for 
pollution abatement and control slowed down considerably after the financial crisis.  
This is a significant finding since increases prior to 1997 had been very high, more 
than double the annual average of GDP growth and more than 50% faster than the rate 
of increase of the General Account of the government budget.  After the crisis, growth 
in pollution abatement and control expenditure was much slower, averaging less than 
a third of the rates of both GDP and the General Account, despite the fact that both 
were notably low in that period.  Similar, changes in budget trends also occurred in 
the business sector expenditures on pollution abatement and control, as well as with 
the budget for the Ministry of Environment of Korea.   
This indicates that the importance of environmental policy relative to other 
policy goals, in particular economic development, declined after the crisis.  Prior to 
the crisis, Korea’s decision makers were making concerted efforts to move in the 
direction of good environmental governance.  Korea was responding well to 
international pressure (in terms of world opinion for its environmental policies and 
requirements for joining various international organizations, such as the OECD) and 
the lobbying and political action of domestic environmental groups.  After the 
financial crisis, however, policy makers interrupted the earlier momentum in Korea’s 
environmental policy because they believed that the recovery of the economy 
depended on a shift in policy priority.   
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It is important to consider the timing and reasoning for the shift in 
environmental policy as it relates to the debate around sustainable development.  
Korea was already a developed country when the financial crisis created the 
conditions under which policy makers lowered the priority of its environmental 
policies.  Therefore, the wealth of a country does not guarantee good environmental 
governance.  For developing countries that are considering adopting a development 
model similar to Korea, this serves as an important lesson.  It may not be feasible to 
pursue a policy of high growth rates at the expense of the environment because clean-
up will always entail making difficult choices.  Economic development policies that 
take into consideration environmental issues then may prove more advantageous, 
since less damage would have accumulated in the process of development.  Korea’s 
policy makers were diverting resources for economic development after the financial 
crisis not because the economy was performing poorly, but compared to Korea’s 
history of high growth rates, the performance of the economy after 1999 seemed 
unacceptable low.   
This paper is divided into six sections.  In the next section, I will give a brief 
overview of the effects of rapid economic development on the natural environment of 
Korea and.  In Section 3 and 4, I will begin my analysis by examining the budgets for 
pollution abatement and control expenditures in the public sector and business sector, 
respectively.  I will further expand my argument in Section 5 by investigating the 
changing trend in the growth of the budget for the Ministry of Environment and the 
total environmental budget of Korea.  Then I will review the current state of Korea’s 
environment in Section 6 by evaluating selected environmental indicators and linking 
the changes in environmental budgets and policies with real world outcomes for the 
natural environment.  I will conclude the paper in Section 7 and discuss some possible 
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implications from the shift in Korea’s environmental policy, as well as possible 
directions for further research in this area.   
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II. OVERVIEW: DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEGRADATION 
 
Korea succeeded in engineering a dramatic transformation of its economy 
during the second half of the 20th century.  Beginning in the early 1960s, Korea’s 
economy grew by leaps and bounds, changing from an agricultural economy to an 
industrialized economy to a high-tech, service economy today.  In 1996, Korea 
became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) – the club of rich nations.  The scale of this transformation, accomplished 
within four short decades, has been repeatedly described as an “economic miracle”.3   
However, in recent years, discourse on Korea’s development has moved from 
analysis of its success, i.e. the policy elements that delivered sustained, high growth 
rates, to analysis of the costs of such rapid industrialization.  During the 
industrialization drive of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Korea’s policy makers 
consistently prioritized the economy over other issues.  This one-dimensional policy 
approach to national development, best summed up by the term “growth first”, was 
successful at lifting the country out of poverty, but it came at a high environmental 
cost (as well as other social and political costs4).   
By the 1980s, Korea was struggling from severe air, water and soil pollution.  
Rapid development and the rise of heavy manufacturing industries released millions 
of tons of air pollutants creating concentrations of SO2, O3, and CO in major 
metropolitan areas that were up to three times greater than national standards.  High 
                                                 
3 See World Bank. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 1993 and Schuman, Michael. “The Miracle Workers.” Time Asia Magazine, Vol. 166, 
Nos. 7/8, August 15-22, 2005. 
4 Korea was governed by a series of military dictatorships beginning with from 1961 to 1987.  The 
process of economic development during this period was generally enforced with a heavy hand.  Along 
with the repression, the Korea’s military regimes also coaxed the citizenry into accepting the rule of 
authoritarian governments with the promise of economic development and rising income levels.   
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rates of urbanization instigated an unending process of construction of housing, 
offices, roads and subways, which choked urban areas with airborne particulates.  The 
increase in automobiles added to the clouding of the skies with smog.   
Municipal, industrial and agricultural water contaminants polluted the 
waterways and coastal areas of Korea.  Untreated sewage and waste water reduced the 
water quality of the four major rivers, with the Han River rarely exceeding the 
international Grade III standard.  Discharge of heavy metals such as cadmium, lead 
and zinc by large industrial complexes decimated fisheries near the coast and greatly 
reduced shell-fish harvests.  And chemical pesticide, fertilizer and herbicide runoff 
from farms contaminated soils and leached into underground aquifers.   
These pollution problems are not unlike the ones faced by other industrialized 
countries during the process of development.  For Korea, however, these difficulties 
are magnified and exacerbated by special characteristics of the country, such as one of 
the highest population densities in the world and a very limited natural resource base, 
resulting in severe environmental degradation.5   
 
Governmental Environmental Action in the 1990s 
The Korean government began tackling pollution and environmental 
degradation in the late 1980s and intensified efforts in the early 1990s.  The impetus 
for the government’s adoption of a stronger environmental policy was due in large 
part to the advocacy work of the environmental movement in Korea.6  Policy makers 
enacted “almost the entire body of environmental legislation now in use” 7 in Korea 
                                                 
5 Moon Chung-in, and Lim Sung-hack. “Weaving Through Paradoxes: Democratization, Globalization, 
and Environment Politics in South Korea.” East Asian Review. 15(2), Summer 2003, p. 46. 
6 See Eder, Norman. Poisoned Prosperity: Development, Modernization, and the Environment in South 
Korea. M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1996. for a thorough and detailed account of the development of the 
environmental movement and its influence on public policy in Korea.  
7 OECD. Environmental Performance Reviews: Korea. Paris, France: OECD, 1997. 
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through a flurry of legislative activity in the early 1990s.  Of the 38 current 
environmental laws in existence in Korea, 33 were created during this period.8  The 
new legislation both significantly expanded and reinforced the body of laws and 
regulations governing the restoration and protection of the environment in Korea.   
In tandem with passing more laws, policy makers also elevated the 
governmental agency responsible for the environment to a ministerial level office in 
1990 – from the Environment Agency to the Ministry of the Environment9 (hereafter 
MOE).  The MOE was further upgraded in 1994 and given full ministry status with 
greater authority, increased manpower and broader jurisdiction.  At the same time, a 
myriad of issues relating to the environment, which had been under the charge of 
other agencies were consolidated within the MOE.  In particular, the Water Supply 
and Sewage Treatment Bureau of the Ministry of Construction, Potable Water 
Management Division of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and Water Quality 
Inspection Department of the National Health Institute were all transferred to the 
MOE.   
Korea’s policy makers demonstrated their ability to act decisively on pressing 
environmental issues in the early 1990s.  They created a more comprehensive set of 
environmental laws to address the broad range of environmental issues.  They 
strengthened institutions by placing responsibility for the environment under one 
agency and elevating that agency to a ministerial power.  In effect, policy planners 
armed the government with the powers needed to clean up and protect the 
                                                 
8 See Appendix I for a listing of Korea’s environmental legislation.   
9 “The Ministry of Environment is the primary government agency responsible for the overall 
protection of Korea’s environment. The Ministry’s activities currently focus on improving the ambient 
environment (managing waste, securing and delivering clean water, ensuring air quality, and protecting 
ecosystems), harmonizing environmental and economic policymaking, and enhancing international 
cooperation on transnational environmental challenges such as the yellow dust phenomenon and 
climate change.”  Source: Ministry of Environment website at <http://eng.me.go.kr>.  
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environment.10  The changes are tantamount to a reorganization of national priorities 
– a move away from the “growth first” policy of economic development that had 
dominated decision making in Korea since the 1960s.   
 
Improvements in Air Quality 
The strengthening of environmental policy in the 1990s has resulted in some 
impressive environmental gains.  Most notable has been improvements in several 
Type II pollutants.11  For example, in the late 1980s, common air pollutants, such as 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), total suspended particulates (TSP) and heavy metal, i.e. lead 
(Pb), significantly exceeded national standards in many of Korea’s major cities.  SO2 
in Seoul averaged over 0.050 ppm (parts per million) each year from 1985 (the  
earliest year of available data) to 1991, while levels for TSP and lead were also very 
high.12   
However, the introduction of key environmental and energy policies, in 
particular, the tightening of emission standards and a switch to low-sulfur fuels, has 
brought about a steady decrease in the concentration of these air pollutants.13  By 
                                                 
10 As early as 1963, Korea had enacted the Anti-Public-Nuisance Control Law to protect the 
environment.  However, the early laws were ineffective because there were no administrative or 
enforcement mechanisms to enforce compliance and because government support of economic 
expansion effectively bypassed the strictures of the legislation.  Eder, Norman. Poisoned Prosperity: 
Development, Modernization, and the Environment in South Korea. M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1996.  
11 Pollution can be categorized into three types.  Type I pollution is poverty-related and occurs mostly 
in developing countries with inadequate basic infrastructure resulting in a lack of access to clean water 
and sanitation.  Type II pollution is associated with industrial production and is problematic for 
countries in the process of rapid industrialization and urbanization.  Common Type II pollutants 
include SO2 and suspended particulates, heavy metal water pollution, and industrial solid waste.  Type 
III pollution is due to consumption and lifestyle changes that are based on mass production, mass 
consumption and mass disposal.  Common Type III issues are increasing CO2 emissions, over 
consumption of resources, increased municipal waste generation, and loss of biodiversity.  See Bai, 
Xuemei and Hidefumi Imura. “A Comparative Study of Urban Environment in East Asia: Stage Model 
of Urban Environmental Evolution,” International Review for Environmental Strategies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
2000, pp. 135 – 158. for a more detailed explanation of the three types of pollution and the process of 
evolution from Type I to Type II to Type III.  
12 See Appendix II for measurements of various air pollution in Korea.  Guidelines on air pollution put 
out by Korea’s Ministry of Environment are reproduced in Appendix III for comparison purposes.   
13 OECD. Environmental Performance Reviews: Korea, Paris, France: OECD, 1997.  
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1997, annual average SO2 concentration in Seoul was 0.011 ppm, down from 0.051 
ppm in 1990, a reduction of almost 80%.  Lead (Pb) concentration fell to 0.1088㎍/㎥ 
(micrograms per cubic meter) from 0.3408 ㎍/㎥ in 1991, a decline of almost 70%.  
And ambient levels of TSP in Seoul decreased by over 50%.14  Similarly, other major 
metropolitan areas in Korea also registered large reductions during this period, 
ranging from 30% – 70% of 1990 pollution levels [See Figures 1 & 2.].   
 
Figure 1. 
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14 OECD. State of the Environment Report. Paris, France: OECD, 2002 
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Figure 2. 
 
Heavy Metal (Pb) Concentrations by Major City, 1991 – 1997 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
H
ea
vy
 M
et
al
 (P
b)
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
(㎍
/㎥
)
Seoul
Busan
Daegu
Inchon
Gwangju
Ulsan
Source: National Statistics Office, Republic of Korea 
 
Stabilizing Water Quality 
Korean policy makers enacted the Water Quality Preservation Act in 1990, 
which imposed stricter emission standards on water pollution.  As a result, emissions 
of organic water pollution declined from 382,898 kilograms per day in 1988 to 
317,902 kilograms per day in 1997, representing a 17% decrease [See Figure 3.].  
Water quality of the Han River, the primary source of tap water for the Seoul 
metropolitan area, began to improve in the early 1990s.  The BOD15 level of the Han 
River, fell to an average of 4.0 ppm (parts per million) in 1993 from over 10.0 ppm in 
the late 1980s.  And the water quality of the three other major rivers, the Nakdong, 
Geum and Yeongsan River, remained relatively constant during this period.  
                                                 
15 Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is an indication of the presence of sewage and other organic 
wastes in water.  High levels of BOD can deplete the oxygen in water and result in the death of fish and 
other aquatic organisms that are unable to escape such conditions.  The national standard for Grade I 
water quality is a BOD measurement of less than 1 ppm.  Refer to the table on Grade Level Index in 
Appendix IV for a listing of the water quality standards of Korea’s water bodies.   
 - 12 - 
Unfortunately, conditions in all four major rivers deteriorated in the mid-1990s due to 
a series of severe droughts from 1993 to 1995.16   
 
Figure 3. 
 
Emissions of Organic Water Pollution, 1988 – 1997 
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Generating Less Municipal Waste 
The amount of municipal solid waste generated each year in Korea also 
declined in the 1990s.  Waste generation had increased dramatically in the 1980s due 
to many factors, including the high rate of urbanization, increasing income levels and 
changes in consumption patterns.  But, from a peak of 92,246 tons per day in 1991, 
municipal solid waste generation declined to 47,895 tons per day in 1997, a cut in 
waste generation by almost half [See Figure 4.].  In terms of the intensity of waste 
                                                 
16 Shortages of rainfall during these years caused water levels in the four major rivers to drop 
significantly and the river systems lost the ability to clean themselves naturally.  So, even with 
declining emissions of water pollutants, concentrations of pollutants in the rivers increased from 1993 
to 1995. 
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generation, which is the amount of waste that is generated per person each year, in 
1991 per capita waste was 773 kg, but in 1997 it was only 378 kg, over a 51% decline.  
So, not only did total waste generation fall in these years, the amount generated per 
person decreased slightly faster.  This is significant considering that the population 
growth rate in Korea was also falling during this period.   
 
Figure 4. 
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These are just some examples of environmental improvements in Korea in the 
early 1990s.  It is an indicator of the strides in improvement that Korea has made with 
respect to various environmental media since policy makers increased the priority of 
environmental policy.  Although these early efforts proved largely successful, changes 
in the prioritization of environmental policy after the financial crisis, especially in 
relation to economic development policy, resulted in more paltry improvements in 
environmental quality.  In the following sections, I will examine the budgets for 
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pollution abatement and control activities in Korea before and after the 1997 financial 
crisis to demonstrate how the early trends in environmental policy did not carry 
through the crisis.   
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III. PUBLIC SECTOR PAC EXPENDITURE 
 
Pollution Abatement and Control Activities 
I begin my analysis by examining expenditures for pollution abatement and 
control (PAC) activities in the public and business sectors to determine the effects of 
the financial crisis on Korea’s environmental policies.  Although PAC expenditures 
represent only a portion of total spending on environmental activities [See Figure 5.], 
it provides a general indication of a country’s environmental policy efforts.  From this 
I will extrapolate more information about Korea’s environmental policies.  By 
examining PAC expenditures before and after the financial crisis, it may be possible 
to draw some conclusions regarding changes in the policy between these two periods. 
 
Figure 5. 
 
Breakdown of Activities of Environmental Management 
 
Source: Reproduced from OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in 
OECD Countries. Paris, France: OECD, 2003. Retrieved on 14 March 2005. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis here, I will be using the definition for PAC 
activities17 from the OECD’s 2003 report: Pollution Abatement and Control 
                                                 
17 In the report, PAC activities are defined as “purposeful activities aimed directly at the prevention, 
reduction and elimination of pollution of nuisances arising as a residual of production processes or the 
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Expenditure in OECD Countries.  The report aggregates spending into four categories 
– waste water, waste, air and other18  – which are labeled as environmental domains.  
These correspond roughly to spending on control of pollution affecting water, land 
and air.  Data in the OECD report is drawn from information provided by the Bank of 
Korea.  In this paper, I will make use of the data from the OECD report for the years 
1995 to 2000, 19 as well as data from the Bank of Korea which has estimates of 
expenditures for 1993 and 1994 and information on spending from 2001 to 2003.  I 
begin my analysis by considering changes in public PAC expenditures 
 
Public Sector PAC Expenditures  
Public sector spending on PAC activities grew significantly between 1993 and 
1997 [See Table 1.].  Public PAC Expenditure increased a total of 77.7% during this 
period, averaging 15.5% annual growth.  During this same period, the General 
Account of the Korean government increased by only 41% and managed an average 
annual growth rate of 9%.  Clearly, spending by the public sector on pollution 
abatement and control activities was increasing at a faster pace than the general 
government budget in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  (Public PAC 
spending was also growing at double the rate of Korea’s GDP.)   
                                                                                                                                            
consumption of goods and services”.  This definition excludes many other activities which are 
environmental in nature but not directed specifically at mitigating or eliminating pollution from 
economic activity, such as natural resource management, prevention of natural disasters, or health and 
safety regulations that have environmental benefits.  OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control 
Expenditure in OECD Countries. Paris, France: OECD, 2003.  
18 The information on public and business expenditure on PAC activities is broken down into four (4) 
environmental domains: Waste water, Waste, Air, and Other.  ‘Other’ includes the following 
categories: protection and remediation of soil, groundwater and surface water, noise and vibration 
abatement, protection against radiation, research and development, and general administration and 
management.  For a detailed description of the measures and activities of each domain, consult Table 2 
on page 17 of OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in OECD Countries. Paris, 
France: OECD, 2003.  
19 The data presented in the 2003 OECD report is recorded according to the “abater principle”, which 
measures the amount spent on the implementation of an activity.  This is in contrast to the “financing 
principle”, which measures the amount spent on the financing of an activity.  For more information, 
refer to OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in OECD Countries. Paris, France: 
OECD, 2003.  
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Table 1. 
 
Annual Growth of Total Public PAC Expenditure, the General Account and 
GDP in Korea, 1994 - 1997 
Year Total Public PAC Expenditure20 
General  
Account GDP 
1994 14.2% 8.1% 8.3% 
1995 17.2% 15.2% 8.9% 
1996 9.2% 8.2% 6.8% 
1997 21.7% 4.7% 5.0% 
Total 77.7% 41.1% 32.2% 
Annual 
Average 15.5% 9.0% 7.2% 
Source: Bank of Korea; IMF; Ministry of Planning and Budget, Republic of Korea 
 
More notable, however, is the fact that public sector spending on PAC 
activities also increased relative to total economic activity in Korea [See Figure 6.].  
Public PAC Expenditure as a percent of GDP increased from 0.71% of GDP in 1993 
to 0.94% of GDP in 1997.  Although this figure is less than the OECD average of 
1.5% of GDP,21 it still represents a significant improvement considering that the 
Korean economy was also growing rapidly during this period.  This increase in 
spending on pollution abatement and control indicates an intensifying commitment by 
the Korean government to environmental issues in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis.   
 
                                                 
20 While there are varying upward and downward changes in public PAC expenditures within 
environmental domains, it is not within the scope of this paper to go into the reasons behind the 
variations in spending in different environmental domains.  I am focusing on the total figure for public 
PAC expenditure in order to establish an indication of the overall approach to the environment by 
policy makers.   
21 You, Jong Il. “The Korea Model of Development and its Environmental Implications,” Chap. 9 in 
The North, the South, and the Environment: Ecological Constraints and the Global Economy. New 
York: United Nations University Press, 1995.  
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Figure 6. 
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Reductions in Public PAC Expenditures in 1998 
When the financial crisis in Asia reached Korea, policymakers in Korea were 
devastated.  Korea recorded its first negative annual growth rate in 18 years with the 
economy contracting by almost 7%.  As a result of the crisis and recession, as well as 
the austerity measures imposed along with the IMF rescue package, the Korean 
government was forced to reduce public spending in many areas.  PAC activities were 
also affected by these cutbacks.  From 1997 to 1998, spending by the public sector on 
pollution abatement and control fell by over 12%.  If changes in spending by 
environmental domain are considered, then Waste water spending experienced the 
largest reduction, falling by over 22%, pulled down by a large cut in the investment 
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expenditure component. 22  Spending for the category of Other also decreased 
significantly, while spending in the remaining two categories, Waste and Air, were 
relatively unaffected (Waste spending grew by 6%, and spending on Air dipped by 
less than 1%).23   
An interesting observation can be drawn from these figures.  First, the impact 
of the crisis on public PAC expenditure varied according to environmental domain.  
Only two categories experienced large budget cuts,24 while the others either remained 
stable or increased.  This suggests that some environmental issues warranted 
continued attention from policy makers.  For example, spending on Waste continued 
to increase during the crisis, so it seems to reason that the growth of solid waste 
remained a high priority for government officials.  Thus, for high priority issues, 
policy makers were able to find the funding to keep PAC activities from being cut.  
This establishes that political will can account as much for the funding of a project as 
prevailing economic conditions; and the recession in 1998 need not have resulted in 
deep cuts in public PAC expenditure.   
 
                                                 
22 Each PAC expenditure figure is composed of investment expenditure, internal current expenditure 
(operational expenses), and the subsidies and fees for pollution abatement and control that are spent by 
various economic agents.  It excludes depreciation, cost of capital and payments for violations or 
compensation, including fines, penalties and interest. 
23 The fact that reductions more severely impacted investment expenditure may lead to greater 
environmental problems in the future.  By reducing the amount of investment expenditure for any 
particular environmental domain, policy makers have delayed the construction of new facilities to deal 
with pollution.  This may prove extremely problematic for Korea in its ability to adequately treat future 
pollution loads in various environmental media.  For example, the demand for waste water treatment in 
Korea continues to exceed current capacity.  Without the timely introduction of additional capacity, 
environmental pressures will increase as the percentage of waste water treated fails to meet adequate 
levels.  
24 Spending on Waste water accounted for the majority of public PAC expenditure (56.3%), while 
spending on Other ranked second to least (2.4%).  This fact effectively rules out assertions that the 
Korean government was cutting the most expensive activities as a means to more efficiently utilize 
public resources during the crisis.   
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Indications of Changes in Environmental Policy 
Although the reductions in public PAC expenditure in 1998 raise some 
questions about the process by which policies are prioritized by decision makers, I am 
more interested in the changes in public PAC spending in the years following the 
recession.  If the magnitude of the crisis and the economic uncertainties that it 
generated are valid reasons for temporarily reducing public budgets, I would expect 
that budget cuts would be reversed when the economy improved.  In this section I will 
compare changes in public PAC spending to changes in the governments General 
Account25 to demonstrate that environmental policy was eroded by the financial crisis.   
The Korean economy recovered quickly from the financial crisis, expanding 
by almost 11% in 1999.  Public PAC expenditures and the government General 
Account also posted similar rates of growth that year with 9.7% and 9.1% increases, 
respectively [See Table 2.].  Although the economy, along with the General Account, 
was still growing at a rapid pace in 2000, public spending on PAC activities fell 7.5%.  
As a percentage of GDP, public PAC expenditure represented only 0.8% of Korea’s 
GDP in 2000, down from 0.9% in 1998.26  Except for the recessionary year 1998, this 
is the first time since 1993 (the earliest available year for data on public PAC 
expenditure) that total public PAC spending did not increase when the economy was 
expanding.27   
 
                                                 
25 The General Account is divided into the following budget line items:  National Defense, Education, 
Social Development, Economic Development, General Administration, Grants to Local Government, 
Repayment of Debt & Others, and Other Expenditures.   
26 In fact, total public PAC expenditure in 2000 (adjusted for inflation) was only 1% greater than 
spending in 1998, when Korea was in a recession.   
27 Interestingly, public PAC expenditures began to increase in 2001 (albeit at a much lower rate than 
before the crisis) even though the economy had slowed down considerably relative to the first two 
years of recovery following the financial crisis.  GDP grew by a little over 3% in 2001 due to the global 
economic slowdown and by 2.5% in 2003 because of a drop in domestic demand attributed to tightened 
consumer credit.  
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Table 2. 
 
Annual Growth of Total Public PAC Expenditure, the General Account and 
GDP in Korea, 1999 - 2003 
Year Total Public PAC Expenditure 
General  
Account GDP 
1999 9.7%  9.1%  10.9% 
2000 - 7.5%  7.8%  9.3% 
2001 4.5%  7.4%  3.1% 
2002 3.0%  7.6%  6.3% 
2003 5.7% 4.3% 2.5% 
Total 5.1% 29.9% 22.9% 
Annual 
Average 1.3% 5.4% 5.3% 
Source: World Bank; Ministry of Budget and Planning, Republic of Korea 
 
The financial crisis seemed to dampen governmental enthusiasm for spending 
on the environment.  From 1999 to 2003, public PAC expenditures increased a total of 
only 5.1%, averaging 1.3% annual increases.  This is in stark contrast to total growth 
of 77.7% during 1993 – 1997 (with an average annual rate of 15.5%).  The General 
Account, however, was not subject to the same resistance to budgetary growth.  After 
the financial crisis, the General Account expanded by almost 30%, which was still a 
very respectable, considering that total growth before the crisis was 30.5%.  Since 
growth in public spending on PAC activities did not resume after the financial crisis 
had abated as the General Account did, it appears that the government had quietly 
shifted environmental issues to the policy backburner after the financial crisis.   
In this section I developed the argument that environmental policy in Korea 
changed after the financial crisis.  I began by examining public PAC expenditure at 
the time of the crisis and found that budget cuts were not equal across environmental 
domains.  Then I showed that the public PAC spending grew at a slower rate and 
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represented a smaller portion of GDP after the crisis.  Lastly, I compared PAC 
expenditure to the General Account before and after the crisis to show that funding for 
PAC activities did not resume pre-crisis growth rates in the same manner that the 
General Account did.   
The findings in this section seem to indicate that policy makers in Korea were 
not forced by the financial crisis to implement serious changes in the funding of 
public PAC expenditure.  Instead, policy makers who were not fully committed to 
environmentalism may have used the opportunity of the crisis to push through desired 
changes in environmental policy.  If environmental policies remained a high priority 
after the financial crisis, then public PAC spending should have returned to rates of 
increases that matched the pre-crisis trend, especially since the economy began to 
perform well again just a little over a year after the initial onset of the crisis.  But this 
was not the case, as I demonstrated in this section.   
Since spending on the General Account began to grow again at rates 
comparable to those before the financial crisis, it raises the suspicion that increased 
funding was available for environmental spending.  Therefore, it seems that it was not 
the circumstances of the financial crisis that forced a change in environmental policy, 
but rather it was a pretext for downgrading the priority of the environment without 
putting the issue to public scrutiny.  Policy makers continued to vocally support 
environmentalism, but they did not provide the same budget commitments that existed 
before the crisis.  In the next section, I will examine business spending on PAC 
activities and evaluate how government leadership is crucial for convincing the 
private sector to maintain needed levels of spending.   
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IV. BUSINESS SECTOR PAC EXPENDITURE 
 
In the previous section, I examined data on public PAC expenditure before 
and after the financial crisis and argued that official attention on the environment had 
waned after 1998.  In this section, I will examine the effect of the financial crisis on 
business sector PAC expenditure.  Analysis of the changes in business PAC spending 
will provide more information about the change in direction of Korea’s environmental 
policy after the financial crisis. 
From 1993 to 1997, business PAC expenditure grew by over 67%.  Recall that 
total public PAC spending grew by almost 78% during the same period [See Table 3.].  
This indicates that changes in environmental policy were having an impact on private 
sector behavior as well.  By 1997, however, total business PAC spending had already 
begun to slow considerably.  Internal current expenditure was still increasing, but 
spending on the investment expenditure for three of the four environmental domains 
had declined significantly.  This translated into an anemic overall growth rate of 1.5% 
for business PAC expenditure in 1997.  Note, however, that public PAC expenditure 
that same year had increased by 21.7%.  It is clear then that the business sector 
reacted more quickly than the government to the rapidly changing economic 
conditions as the financial crisis unfolded in late 1997.  
 
Table 3. 
 
Growth of PAC Expenditures and GDP Before and After the Financial Crisis 
Period Business PAC Public PAC GDP 
1993 – 1997 67.8% 77.7% 32.2% 
1999 - 2003 30.7% 5.1% 22.9% 
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
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Changing Trends in Spending After the Financial Crisis 
In 1998, business PAC spending was down 22.6% (almost twice as much as 
the drop in the public sector).  This sharp decline can be explained simply as 
reduction due to sound business decision making.  Basically, businesses increase 
activities during expansionary economic periods and reduce activities during 
contractionary periods.  So, as economic conditions soured in 1997 and quickly 
became recessionary in 1998, it is reasonable for businesses to reduce investment and 
look for other cost-cutting measures, including spending on PAC activities.  With an 
improving economic situation, the reverse should be true.  Businesses would have the 
means to invest in environment-related expenses.   
It is not unreasonable then to expect the growth rates of business PAC 
expenditure to converge towards pre-crisis levels with the passing of the financial 
crisis.  Even with low growth in 2001 and 2003, 28 Korea’s GDP still managed a rate 
of expansion in 1999 – 2003 of approximately two-thirds of the total for 1993 - 1997.  
But, despite this economic turnaround, growth in business PAC spending did not 
increase more quickly.  Even with an impressive jump in spending of 17.8% during 
the economic recovery in 1999, growth in business PAC expenditure for the period 
1999 to 2003 was less than half of the 67.8% total for 1993 to 1997.29  [See Table 4.]  
As a percentage of GDP, business PAC expenditure performance was just as 
disappointing, remaining below pre-crisis levels until 2002.  
 
                                                 
28 See Footnote 27.   
29 Similarly, the average rate of growth in business PAC expenditures from 1999 to 2003 was just 
slightly under 7%, whereas it was almost 14%, from 1993 to 1997.  
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Table 4. 
 
Comparison of PAC Expenditure Growth, 1998 - 2003 
Year Total Business PAC Expenditure
Total Public PAC 
Expenditure GDP 
1999 17.8% 9.7% 10.9% 
2000 6.3% -7.5% 9.3% 
2001 6.0% 4.5% 3.1% 
2002 10.5% 3.0% 6.3% 
2003 5.0% 5.7% 2.5% 
Total 30.7% 5.1% 22.9% 
Annual Average 6.9% 1.3% 5.3% 
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
 
Difference between Public and Business Sector Responses to the Financial Crisis 
Another point of interest is that business PAC expenditure dropped in all four 
environmental domains.  This did not happen in the public sector.  And it is a 
reminder of the poignant difference between the approaches of the two sectors to 
environmental issues.  The public sector, though responsive to economic conditions, 
must ultimately also be accountable to larger social goals – in this case, the people’s 
desire for a cleaner environment.30  So, pressure on the public sector to cut 
government spending and reduce PAC spending during the crisis was tempered to 
some degree by the need to meet society’s expectations of environmental quality.  
                                                 
30 Careful scrutiny of the spending by environmental domain by the business and public sector reveals a 
noticeable difference in commitment between the two sectors.  Between 1995 and 2000, the business 
sector spent approximately the same amount on the three environmental domains of Waste water, 
Waste and Air.  Starting in 2001, there was more discrepancy in the amount of spending between these 
three categories, but it was still distributed fairly evenly.  Compare this to spending by the public sector, 
which concentrated its PAC budget on the areas of Waste water and Waste.  During the entire period 
1993 to 2003, spending on PAC activities for these two categories accounted for well over 90% of all 
public PAC spending.  These differences are a reflection of the differing priorities of the two sectors.  
The business sector had to clean up the waste and pollution that resulted from production processes.  
The public sector had to meet environmental target goals for society, such as sewage connection rates 
and drinking water quality.  
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Business sector PAC spending felt relatively less pressure from these constraints in 
their response to the crisis.    
With the onset of the financial crisis, the business sector immediately adjusted 
the level of funding of PAC activities to the degree permitted by environmental policy.  
In the new policy climate of the crisis, however, this amounted to large reductions in 
environmental budgets, including PAC expenditures.31  Korean officials were very 
concerned about the state of the economy following the crisis and were determined to 
revive the economy at any cost.  And as with the “growth first” policy during Korea’s 
industrialization drive, the environment again bore the brunt of the costs.  The private 
sector had demanded a relaxation of environmental regulations immediately following 
the financial crisis.  The Ministry of Environment obliged by “pledging to remove 193 
regulations (30 percent of total regulations) and loosen 185 regulations (28.8 
percent)”.32  By bowing to business pressure during the financial crisis, Korean policy 
makers abdicated the leadership role of government on the environment and sent a 
clear signal that the environment could be sacrificed to some degree for the sake of 
economic recovery.  Official support for effective environmental policy turned into 
rhetoric.   
 
                                                 
31 “Big Enterprises Cut Facilities Investment for Environment.” Korea Times. 10 Oct. 1999.  
32 Moon Chung-in, and Lim Sung-hack. “Weaving Through Paradoxes: Democratization, Globalization, 
and Environment Politics in South Korea.” East Asian Review, 15(2), Summer 2003.  
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL BUDGET OF KOREA 
 
In the previous two sections, I analyzed the trends in the PAC expenditures in 
the public and business sector to demonstrate that the financial crisis had created the 
opportunity for a shift in environmental policy in Korea.  In the late 1990s, policy 
makers were beginning to adopt a new approach to environmental policy that focused 
more on pollution prevention rather than pollution control.  This may have 
contributed to the decline in PAC spending.  However, by examining the changes in 
the budget trends for the total environmental budget33 of Korea, I will counter the 
objection that new policy designs were the main cause for changes in PAC budgets.  I 
will demonstrate that the same pattern of changing budget trends applies to Korea’s 
environmental budget over the period 1994 to 2003, which further strengthens my 
claim that an environmental policy shift occurred after the financial crisis.   
Upon initial examination of Korea’s environmental budget, it appears that 
policy planners continued to place a high priority on the environment because 
allocations to the budget continued to increase each year after the crisis.  From 1994 
to 2003, the total budget increased by over three-fold and averaged over 17% annual 
growth [See Table 5.].   
 
                                                 
33 The environmental budget of Korea as published by the Ministry of the Environment is an aggregate 
of 1) the budget for the Ministry of Environment, 2) the budgets for environment-related activities in 
other ministries, and 3) the budget for Investment Expenditure on Water Quality by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy.  For my analysis, I am relying only on data for (1) and (3) as published and 
available in English by the Ministry of Environment, South Korea.   
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Table 5. 
 
Growth Rates for Korea’s Environmental Budget, 1994 - 2003 
Year MOE Budget Water Quality Improvement Total 
1995 42.67% 25.3% 36.7% 
1996 31.5% 27.5% 30.2% 
1997 22.0% 72.6% 37.7% 
1998 3.1% -10.7% -2.3% 
1999 3.6% 9.5% 5.7% 
2000 12.9% 38.8% 22.4% 
2001 8.6% 31.5% 18.1% 
2002 1.4% 16.7% 8.5% 
2003 -2.1% 10.8% 4.4% 
Total 197.6% 536.0% 314.6% 
Annual 
Average 12.9% 22.8% 17.1% 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
 
Analyzing the Components of the Environmental Budget 
However, closer examination of the two components of the environmental 
budget, the Ministry of Environment budget and the budget for water quality 
improvement, reveals some interesting findings.  First, the MOE budget grew at a 
much faster rate before the economic crisis than after.  The annual average rate of 
increase between 1993 and 1997 was 31.8%.  It was only 5.0% between 1999 and 
2003.  This translates into a total growth of 129% for 1994 – 1997 and only 22% for 
1999 – 2003 [See Table 6.].  So, compared to the explosive growth before the 
financial crisis, the MOE budget was almost stagnant after the crisis.  This is a 
significant change in budget trends and follows the same pattern as public PAC 
spending during those years.   
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Table 6. 
 
Growth of the Environmental Budget Before and After the Financial Crisis 
Period MOE Budget Water Quality Improvement Total 
1994 - 1997 129% 175% 145% 
1998 - 2003 22% 136% 64% 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
 
Second, the budget for Allowance for Water Quality Improvement grew 
almost the same amount before and after the crisis [See Table 6.].  As such, it became 
an increasingly larger portion of the total environmental budget in the years after the 
crisis, representing 53% of all spending on the environment in 2003.   Therefore, the 
growth in the budget for Allowance for Water Quality Improvement effectively 
buoyed spending on the environment and explains how the environmental budget 
continued to increase, even after the financial crisis.   
 
Comparison with the General Account of the Government 
Another interesting observation about the total environmental budget is that it 
grew slower than the General Account of the Korean government in the period after 
the financial crisis [See Table 7.].  The General Account grew by 29.9% between 
1999 and 2003, which was slightly higher than growth in the MOE budget However, 
for 1994 to 1997, the General Account expanded by 30.5%, but growth in the MOE 
budget was almost five times greater between 1994 and 1997.  The continuance of the 
funding increases for the General Account indicates that policy makers were able to 
find the money for the other government ministries.  Therefore, the weak growth of 
the MOE budget after the financial crisis was a policy choice, not because decision 
makers were forced to reformulate environmental policy in the face of economic 
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uncertainty.  Policy makers kept the MOE budget almost unchanged even as official 
rhetoric continued to support a strong environmental policy.   
 
Table 7. 
 
Comparison of Growth in the Environmental Budget and the General Account 
Period Total Environmental Budget General Account 
1994 – 1997 145% 30.5% 
1999 – 2003 64% 29.9% 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
 
One might claim that growth in the environmental budget after the financial 
crisis could not have kept pace with growth in the General Account because 
government spending was highly inflated for purposes of economic recovery.  The 
need for government intervention during the financial crisis would have resulted in 
the injection of significant amounts of resources into the General Account.   Therefore, 
even if the environmental budget did grow at a reasonable rate – enough to sustain the 
policy goals at the time – the jump in various budget areas of the General Account, i.e. 
Economic Development, would have overshadowed the increases in spending on the 
environment.   
The government did, in fact, increase the budget for Economic Development 
in 1997 and 1998 to stimulate the economy and spent large sums to repay the loan 
from the IMF.  However, for the period 1999 – 2003, the growth rate of the budget for 
Economic Development was actually lower than before the crisis.34  In fact, it 
decreased three times in the years after the financial crisis.  Moreover, spending in 
                                                 
34 The annual average rate of growth of the Economic Development budget line item in the General 
Account was only 2.7% for the period 1999 – 2003.  It was more that 5 times greater in the years 
before the crisis, averaging 14.8% annually.   
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five of the eight budget areas of the General Account increased more quickly than the 
budget for Economic Development after the crisis.  So, the growth in General 
Account after the financial crisis is not completely attributable to growth in Economic 
Development spending.  Much of the spending was, in fact, not crucial for economic 
recovery efforts [See Figure 7.].   
 
Figure 7. 
 
Government Spending on the General Account (Inclusive and Exclusive of 
Economic Development and Debt Repayment Budgets)  
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The analysis of the environmental budget in this section further supports my 
claim that environmental policy in Korea changed after the financial crisis.  Although 
the official position of Korea’s policy makers throughout the 1990s is one of strong 
support for the environment, the change in the budget trend after the financial crisis 
indicates a change in attitude and policy.  It seems likely that policy makers were 
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capitalizing on the situation of the financial crisis to quietly shift official (and public) 
attention off environmental issues and programs.  As I stated earlier, businesses in 
Korea was very active in lobbying the government for environmental “reforms” in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  The private sector believed that environmental 
regulations impeded the ability of businesses to recover from the crisis.  Whether 
these claims were valid or not, the result was a change in environmental policy, which 
is reflected in the changes in budget trends discussed in the previous three sections.  
In the next section, I will compare selected environmental indicators before and after 
the financial crisis to establish a connection between the changes in environmental 
budget trends and the current state of the environment Korea.   
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VI. CURRENT STATE OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL 
INDICATORS 
 
In the previous sections, I established that the funding for the environment in 
Korea was adversely affected by the financial crisis.  Initially, resources were diverted 
to economic recovery activities.  But, even after the economy recovered in 1999 and 
began another period of growth, the various environmental budgets continued to grow 
slowly while other areas of government spending, i.e. the General Account, began 
expanding at approximately the pre-crisis rate.  In this section, I will examine various 
environmental indicators to determine how the sluggish environmental budgets 
affected the state of pollution in Korea after the crisis.   
As stated before, there had been significant improvement in air quality in 
Korea starting in the late 1980s.  The atmospheric concentration of second-phase 
pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide (SO2), total suspended particles (TSP), and heavy 
metal (lead), decreased steadily throughout the first half of the 1990s.  However, these 
indicators have not improved discernibly after the financial crisis.35  From 1998 to 
2003, the ambient levels of these pollutants for Korea as a whole have remained 
roughly constant.  In the case of suspended particulate matter, concentrations began to 
increase after 1998 and are only just beginning to decline.  Of course, the pollution 
situation differed between Korea’s major cities, but the overall effect was a lack of 
significant improvement.  The decreases in air pollution in some of Korea’s major 
cities were offset by increases in other cities [See Figures 8, 9, and 10.].   
 
                                                 
35 Note that these indicators continue to decrease each year when measured in units per capita or units 
per dollar GDP.  However, such improvements in terms of “efficiency” do not automatically translate 
into absolute reductions.  Since population and GDP are both increasing over time, small gains in 
efficiency improvements in some cases cannot compensate for overall total growth.   
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Figure 8. 
 
Average Annual Ambient Concentration of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) in Korea’s 
Major Cities, 1993 - 2003 
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Source: National Statistics Office, Republic of Korea 
Figure 9. 
 
Average Annual Ambient Concentration of Total Suspended Particulates (PM10) 
in Korea’s Major Cities, 1993 - 2003 
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Source: National Statistics Office, Republic of Korea 
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Figure 10. 
 
Average Annual Ambient Concentration of Heavy Metal: Lead (Pb) in Korea’s 
Major Cities, 1993 - 2003 
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Source: National Statistics Office, Republic of Korea 
Similarly, issues of water quality and solid waste generation also failed to 
improve after 1997.  While BOD levels declined slightly in the years after 1997, 
compared to levels in the early 1990s, it did not represent any significant overall 
improvement.36  The rivers in Korea remained generally remained at the same grade 
levels that were achieved in the early 1990s.37  Three of the four major rivers were at 
Grade Level III at the end of the decade; while the stayed at Grade Level II [See 
Figure 11.].   
 
                                                 
36 Recall, that water quality had worsened in the mid-1990s due to several years of severe drought.  
Therefore, in many instances BOD levels were higher at the time of the financial crisis than in the early 
1990s.  So, even though BOD levels declined after 1997, net improvement for the 1990s was negligible.   
37 Policy makers have recognized the need to address the issue of poor water quality in Korea.  The 
continued expansion of the budget for Allowance for Water Quality Improvement after the financial 
crisis is evidence to this fact.  For an overview of the Korean government’s efforts at water 
management, see the report to the United Nations titled Freshwater Country Profile: Republic of Korea. 
Follow-up Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, United Nations, 2004.  
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Figure 11. 
 
Water Quality Trends of the Four Major Rivers 
 
Source: Reproduced from Environmental Information Network in North East Asia 
Region at <http://www.npec.or.jp/northeast_asia/en/environmental/page03.html> 
 
 
Improvements in reduction of solid waste generation also failed to carry 
through after the financial crisis.  Generation of municipal solid waste had fallen 
dramatically in the early 1990s, but began to increase again after 1998 [See Figure 
12.].  The amount of increase from 1998 to 2003 is approximately 14%, which is not 
very large.  However, it does represent a clear change in the trend of municipal solid 
waste generation.  In addition, coupled with the alarming increase in industrial and 
construction waste during the same period (74%), it is imperative that policy makers 
do more to address the issue of solid waste in Korea, especially since there is already 
major difficulties associated with the adequate disposal of such waste.   
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Figure 12. 
 
Municipal Solid Waste Generation, 1998 – 2003 
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From reviewing the state of a few select environmental indicators, it is clear 
that the financial crisis had a significant impact on environmental policy.  Korea 
managed to achieve some impressive environmental gains from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, especially with respect to Type II pollutants.  But, environmental quality 
ceased to improve much in the years following the financial crisis.  This denotes a 
correlation between the slowdown in the growth of the environmental budget and the 
lack of improving environmental indicators.  Therefore, more must be done by policy 
makers, in particular provision of adequate funding of existing policies, in order to 
regain the momentum of environmental improvement that was evident before the 
financial crisis.  The current stalemate in the fight against Type II pollutants means 
that further reductions may require increased commitment by policy makers, more 
than they have been willing to provide after the financial crisis.   
 - 38 - 
In addition, as Korea continues to develop and become wealthier, it will have 
to face the issue of Type III pollutants, some of which are already becoming evident.38  
CO2 emissions will continue to increase as the economy grows and requires more 
energy inputs.  NOx emissions will also increase due mostly to growing numbers of 
automobiles on the road.  And generation of solid waste will increase as Korea 
continues its transformation into a mass consumption society.  The evidence of 
handling of environmental policy after the financial crisis suggests that Korean policy 
makers may be unable to contend with the emerging problems of Type III pollutants.  
Future success will depend on the degree to which policy makers can decouple 
economic development and emissions growth.  Sustainable development has been 
trumpeted as the means to achieve such goals, but it will require making difficult 
policy choices, which policy makers have already demonstrated to be unpalatable in 
the wake of the financial crisis.39   
 
                                                 
38 See Footnote 11 for a description of Type III pollutants.  
39 The Korean government adopted Green Vision 21 in 1995 as a comprehensive and integrated 
strategic plan for sustainable development.  “The main objective of Green Vision 21 is to improve the 
quality of life by maintaining the balance between development and conservation, without 
compromising the well being of future generations.  It also deals with the concerns of ministries other 
than the MOE, in the areas of natural environment conservation, air quality management, water quality 
management, marine environment preservation, drinking water supply management, waste 
management, and environmental technology development.” United Nations. National Assessment 
Report on the Implementation of Sustainable Development: Republic of Korea. Report to the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, United Nations, 2002. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I demonstrated that the 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis 
has had a persistent negative impact on environmental policy in Korea.  As the crisis 
unfolded, economic recovery efforts forced budget reductions in many policy areas, 
including the environment.  Although these cutbacks were temporary, the change in 
the attitudes of policy makers towards environmental issues prevailed well afterwards.  
Analysis of environmental budget trends after 1997 showed that spending on the 
environment grew much more slowly than before the financial crisis.  This is evidence 
of the decline in priority of environmental issues during this period.   
I began my analysis by briefly describing the changes in environmental policy 
in Korea beginning in the late 1980s and continuing until the financial crisis.  In 
particular, I noted that environmental regulations and measures were expanded and 
strengthened considerably in the early 1990s.  Improvements in many areas of the 
environment were realized in Korea in the years leading up to the crisis because these 
expanded policies were backed by sizable increases to the environmental budgets.   
In Section 3 and 4, I examined pollution control and abatement (PAC) 
expenditures in the public and business sector before and after the financial crisis.  
From the analysis, I demonstrated that the trend in spending on PAC activities had 
slowed and became more erratic after the financial crisis.  A temporary reduction in 
spending is a reasonable response to an economic crisis, but a prolonged slowdown 
implies that factors other than the crisis are effecting a change in pollution abatement 
and control activities, i.e. a change in policy priority.  Business PAC spending 
exhibited a similar pattern in its growth rates.  Since pollution abatement and control 
activities are highly regulated in Korea, this suggests that policy makers permitted 
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businesses to subordinate environmental clean-up and protection activities.  It was 
noted that the government had even lifted and relaxed a majority of environmental 
regulations to accommodate the demands of the private sector after the financial crisis.   
In section 5, I examined the total environmental budget for Korea, breaking it 
down into its two main components – the budget for the Ministry of Environment and 
the budget for Water Quality Improvement.  The MOE budget essentially stagnated 
after the crisis and the total environmental budget managed to continue growing after 
the crisis only because of hefty infusions by the government for Water Quality 
Improvement spending.  During this period, however, spending in other budget areas 
of the government increased steadily.  As the lead agency for all matters relating to 
the environment, the lack of sizable budgetary increases for the MOE considerably 
limited the organizational and coordination capacity of the agency.  This is especially 
significant in the late 1990s as Korea was attempting to move towards sustainable 
development policies.   
Lastly, I reviewed the state of the environment in Korea after 1997 in section 6.  
The evidence further supported my position regarding the change in the importance of 
environmental policy.  With respect to some common environmental indicators, 
Korea’s record did not improve much after the financial crisis.  Air quality had 
improved appreciably from the late 1980s, but then leveled off after the financial 
crisis.  In the case of total suspended particulates, the concentration of pollutants in 
the atmosphere even worsened slightly.  Water quality also remained roughly constant 
during this period.  It is clear from these examples that spending on the environment 
after the crisis had been inadequate for further improving environmental quality in 
Korea.  These are the consequences of the change in priority of environmental policy.   
 - 41 - 
It should be noted that the shift in policy was subtle; it was not pronounced 
with a drastic measure, such as a rollback of environmental budgets or the repeal of 
environmental legislation.  Such bold initiatives were not politically feasible, 
especially since the majority of Koreans continue to rank the environment as a top 
priority even after the financial crisis.  In fact, policy makers continued to publicly 
support the expansion of environmental protection and the promotion of sustainable 
development after the crisis.  A quick review of press releases by the Ministry of 
Environment bears this out.  However, the lack of financial commitment to the 
environment in the form of adequate budget increases implies otherwise.   
In the midst of the financial crisis, policy makers were understandably very 
concerned about the state of the economy.  After the crisis had passed, however, 
policy makers continued to act on the assumption that the economy was unstable even 
though Korea’s economy continued to expand each year from 1999 to 2003.  The 
need to balance the environment and development, which had been gaining wider 
understanding and acceptance in policy circles in the early 1990s, yielded to the 
“needs” of economic growth.  Thus, the financial crisis created the conditions, i.e. 
economic uncertainty, within which policy makers reestablished the preeminence of 
economic development in public policy. Spending on economic development 
continued to increase throughout this entire period, echoing the “growth first” policy 
that had driven economic development in Korea for decades.   
 
Implications 
There are a number of implications that arise from the results of this paper.  
First, inadequate funding of the environment may delay the achievement of 
environmental goals.  Slow annual budget increases will necessarily slow the 
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expansion of environmental activities.  Additionally, it may result in competition 
between different policies, forcing compromises that further hinder expedient 
environmental results.  These potential delays may prove crucial, especially as to the 
impact of environmental pollution on peoples’ health.  A clean and healthy 
environment is not just an idyllic notion of nature.  It relates to tangible issues, such as 
public health.  Hampering pollution clean up may correspond to greater public health 
consequences due to longer or more intense exposure to health hazards.  This 
translates into economic costs because of greater health care costs and time lost from 
work.   
Second, lowering environmental priority because of a national crisis sets a bad 
policy precedent.  Policy makers who are forced to make similarly difficult decisions 
in the future between the environment and the economy will repeatedly choose 
development without regarding the trade off in or actual costs of such reactive policy 
making.  This bias in favor of economic growth essentially shackles environmental 
policy to GDP in an era when most policy makers recognize the necessity of 
balancing development and the environment.  While Korea can more easily recover 
from such actions, developing countries that choose to abandon environmental policy 
may incur irreparable losses; for example, Indonesia’s burning of tropical forests in 
1997 for increasing palm oil exports.   
Lastly, the shift in environmental policy portends poorly for Korea’s policy 
towards Type III pollutants, such as CO2 and NOx emissions, which are rapidly 
becoming a problem regionally and globally.  Addressing these issues will require 
making some difficult and potentially economically painful choices, at least in the 
short run, in order to decouple emissions growth from economic growth.  In the case 
of CO2, Korean policy makers have already indicated that Korea may be unable or 
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unwilling to implement reductions because it will result in a competitive disadvantage 
for Korea in the global economy.  This despite the fact the Korea has already ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol.40  In the case of NOx, curbing emissions will require an overhaul 
of Korea’s transportation policy, one that slows the growth in the number of private 
automobiles on the road each year.   
Although importance of the environment has given ground to development in 
Korea, it is possible for the balance to shift back.  It was the strength of the 
environmental movement that initially forced Korean officials to adopt a strong stance 
on the environment.  Therefore, advocacy and continued vigilance can again bolster 
current environmental policy.  The lessons of the financial crisis serve as warning 
about the danger of poor policy choices coming from good intentions.  Economic 
development is important.  But, quality of life is more than just a measure of a 
country’s GDP or the median income of its citizens; it includes other important 
considerations, among which is a clean environment.   
 
Further Research 
This paper adds to the discussion on sustainable development, which is 
predicated on balancing development and the environment.  The results of this paper 
demonstrate that such a balance can be tenuous, even in a relatively wealthy country 
like Korea.  Future studies may want to focus on specific environmental policies 
around the period of the financial crisis.  When data about individual project budgets 
becomes available, an analysis of the implementation of policies, actual versus 
planned, can yield valuable information about Korea’s commitment to the 
environment.  It would be interesting to determine the degree to which delays in 
                                                 
40 Nesirky, Martin and Kim, Jack. “Kyoto Protocol Tough for Emerging Economies,” online, PlanetArk 
- Reuters, 29 Mar. 2005.  
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achieving environmental goals after the financial crisis are attributed to policy 
interferences.  Analysis of budgets between environmental media can provide 
information about the decision making process by which policy makers implemented 
budget changes.  This can establish whether environmental budget changes were 
based on the relative importance and urgency of an environmental issue or whether 
the changes were based on regionalism or other political reasons.   
Korea was not a poor, developing country when the financial crisis struck.  
And yet, policy makers revealed their bias against the environment when the 
economic situation of the country seemed uncertain.  Such prejudices within policy 
circles need to be fully addressed if the concept of sustainable development is to be 
fully integrated into national development decision making in Korea.  As stated 
earlier, difficult decisions regarding trade-offs between the environment and the 
economy will abound, but for Korea to truly move towards an environmentally-
friendly society, then commitments to the environment must be just as strong as those 
to development.  Otherwise there is no guarantee that policy makers will maintain 
environmental priorities during times of crisis.   
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APPENDIX A: ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION  
 
Table A1. 
Major Environmental Legislation, Republic of Korea 
Legislation  Legislated  Amended  
Basic Environmental Policy Act  1 Aug 1990  31 Dec 1999 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act on 
Environment, Transportation and Natural 
Disaster  
31 Dec 1999     
Act Relating to Environmental Technology 
Support and Development  
   3 Feb 2000 
(Wholly)  
Environmental Dispute and Settlement Act     28 Aug 1997 
Act Relating to Environmental Improvement 
Charges  
31 Dec 1991  8 Feb 1999  
Act Relating to Special Accounting for 
Environmental Improvement  
5 Jan 1994  30 Dec 1996 
Act Relating to Punishment for Environmental 
Crime  
   31 Dec 1999 
Environmental Management Corporation Act  21 May 1983  27 Dec 1993 
Natural Environment Preservation Act  31Dec 1991  3 Aug 1994, 
1997, 2001  
Natural Park Act  4 Jan 1980  28 Mar 2001 
Wetland Preservation Act  8 Feb 1999     
Act Relating to Protection of Birds, Mammals 
and Hunting  
   30 Dec 1983, 
1999  
Special Act on the Ecosystem Preservation of 
Island such as Dokdo Island  
13 Dec 1997     
Soil Environment Preservation Act  5 Jan 1995  28 Mar 2001 
Air Quality Preservation Act  1 Aug 1990  28 Aug 1997, 
1999  
Water Quality Preservation Act  1 Aug 1990  27Jan 2001  
Noise and Vibration Control Act  1 Aug 1990  7 Mar 1997  
Act Relating to Water Resources Management 
in Han River and Community Supply  
8 Feb 1999  16 Jan 2001  
Act Relating to the Treatment of Sewage, Night 
Soil and Livestock Wastewater  
8 Mar 1991  8 Feb 1999  
Sewerage System Act  3 Aug 1966  28 Mar 2001 
Drinking Water Management Act     31 Dec 1999 
Waste Management Act     31 Dec 1999 
Act Relating to Promotion of Resources Saving 
and Reutilization  
8 Dec 1992  8 Feb 1999  
Act Relating for Promotion of Waste Treatment 
Facilities and Local Community  
8 Dec 1992  8 Feb 2001  
Act Relating to Transboudary Movement of 
Waste and Their Disposal  
8 Dec 1992  16 Jan 2001  
Act Relating to Establishment and Operation of 
Sudokwon Landfill Management Corporation  
21 Jan 2000     
Toxic Chemicals Control Act     30 Dec1996, 
1999  
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Legislation  Legislated  Amended  
Korea Resource Recover and Reutilization 
Corporation Act  
27 Dec 1993     
Environmental Impact Assessment Act  11 June 1993  7 Mar 1997  
Special Act on Nakdong River’s Watershed 
Management  
7 Dec 2001     
Special Act on Geum River’s Watershed 
Management  
7 Dec 2001     
Special Act on Yeongsan and Seomjin River’s 
Watershed Management  
7 Dec 2001     
Source: UNEP, Country Profile Report, Republic of Korea available at 
<http://www.rrcap.unep.org/country/cp/easia/cp_ROKorea.cfm> 
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APPENDIX B: POLLUTION DATA 
 
Table B1. 
Average Annual Concentration of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) by Major City, 1985 - 2003 
Unit: parts per million (ppm) 
    1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Seoul  0.056 0.054 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.051 0.043 0.035
Busan  0.047 0.042 0.039 0.044 0.047 0.039 0.038 0.033
Daegu  0.039 0.043 0.055 0.052 0.048 0.041 0.041 0.040
Inchon  0.052 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.065 0.044 0.041 0.036
Gwangju  0.020 0.02 0.014 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.017
Daejeon  0.033 0.027 0.026 0.034 0.035 0.029 0.028 0.022
Ulsan  0.030 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.035 0.033
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Seoul 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
Busan 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.01 0.008 0.007 0.006
Daegu 0.035 0.038 0.031 0.023 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006
Inchon 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007
Gwangju 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004
Daejeon 0.020 0.021 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004
Ulsan 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.022 0.019 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.012 0.01 0.011
Source: National Statistical Office, Republic of Korea 
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Table B2. 
Annual Average Concentration of Heavy Metal (Pb) in the Atmosphere by Major City, 1991 - 2003 
Unit: micrograms per cubic meter (㎍/㎥) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Seoul 0.3408 0.2860 0.2090 0.1907 0.1844 0.1495 0.1088 0.0936 0.0984 0.0825 0.0743 0.0832 0.0584
Busan 0.2471 0.1408 0.1759 0.1438 0.0705 0.1023 0.0829 0.1096 0.1030 0.1004 0.0698 0.0751 0.0512
Daegu 0.1379 0.1078 0.0476 0.0439 0.0138 0.0315 0.0302 0.0358 0.0367 0.0269 0.0515 0.0698 0.0576
Inchon 0.4270 0.3947 0.2588 0.2455 0.2427 0.2160 0.1704 0.1256 0.1263 0.1203 0.1290 0.1059 0.1213
Gwangju 0.1183 0.0870 0.0536 0.0470 0.0487 0.0442 0.0331 0.0089 0.0086 0.0435 0.0347 0.0331 0.0310
Daejeon 0.1573 0.1433 0.2573 0.2761 0.3666 0.1405 0.1806 0.0885 0.0990 0.0806 0.0595 0.0482 0.0457
Ulsan 0.1043 0.0905 0.0866 0.0826 0.0457 0.0662 0.0688 0.0703 0.0663 0.0673 0.0565 0.0678 0.0565
Yeosu 0.0540 0.0569 0.0342 0.0318 0.0420 0.0293 0.0154 0.0015 0.0022 0.0281 0.0280 0.0352 0.0174
Pohang 0.0848 0.0760 0.0619 0.0568 0.0289 0.0244 0.0305 0.0454 0.0466 0.0393 0.0768 0.0806 0.0720
Source: National Statistical Office, Republic of Korea 
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Table B3. 
Average Annual Concentration of Suspended Particulate Matter (PM-10) by Major City, 1995 - 2003 
Unit: micrograms per cubic meter (㎍/㎥) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Seoul - - 78 72 68 59 66 65 71 76 69 
Busan - - 73 76 68 67 65 62 60 69 55 
Daegu - - 81 87 72 72 66 63 67 71 59 
Inchon - - 76 67 70 57 53 53 52 57 61 
Gwangju - - 49 51 49 49 56 58 57 52 36 
Daejeon - - 63 63 69 58 55 51 48 53 43 
Ulsan - - 69 51 43 29 29 52 53 54 40 
Source: National Statistical Office, Republic of Korea 
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APPENDIX C: AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES 
 
Table C1. 
Guidelines for Annual Ambient Air Concentration of Various Pollutants 
Pollutant MOE WHO 
Sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) 
(Before 2001)  
Yearly avg < 0.03 ppm  
 
(After 2001)  
Yearly avg < 0.02 ppm  
 
24-hour avg <0.05 ppm 
 
1-hour avg <0.15 ppm 
 
 
 
 
 
Yearly avg < 100 µg/m3  
 
24-hour avg < 250 µg/m3 
 
(Note: 1 ppm = 2860 µg/m3) 
 
Suspended 
particulate matter 
(PM10) 
(Before 2001)  
Yearly avg < 80 µg/m3 
 
(After 2001)  
Yearly avg < 70 µg/m3 
 
24-hour avg < 150 µg/m3 
 
None 
Lead (Pb) (Before 2001)  
3-month avg < 1.5 µg/m3 
 
(After 2001)  
Yearly avg < 0.5 µg/m3 
 
 
 
 
 
Yearly avg < 0.5 µg/m3 
 
Nitrogen dioxide 
(NO2) 
Yearly avg < 0.05 ppm 
 
24-hour avg < 0.08 ppm 
 
1-hour avg < 0.15 ppm 
 
 
Yearly avg < 40 µg/m3 
 
 
 
1-hour avg < 200 µg/m3 
 
(Note: 1 ppm = 1880 µg/m3) 
 
Carbon Monoxide 
(CO) 
8-hour avg < 9 ppm 
 
1-hour avg < 25 ppm 
 
 
8-hour avg < 10,000 µg/m3 
 
1-hour avg < 30,000 µg/m3 
 
(Note: 1 ppm = 1,145 µg/m3) 
Ozone (O3) 8-hour avg < 0.06 ppm 
 
1-hour avg < 0.1 ppm 
 
8-hour avg < 120 µg/m3 
 
(Note: 1 ppm = 2000 µg/m3) 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea; World Health Organization
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APPENDIX D: WATER QUALITY GUIDELINES 
 
Table D1. 
Grade Level Index of Rivers and Streams 
Unit: mg/L 
Grade Level pH BOD Suspended Solids 
Dissolved 
Oxygen 
I 6.5 ~ 8.5 < 1 < 25 Above 7.5 
II 6.5 ~ 8.5 < 3 < 25 Above 5 
III 6.5 ~ 8.5 < 6 < 25 Above 5 
IV 6.0 ~ 8.5 < 8 < 100 Above 2 
V 6.0 ~ 8.5 < 10 No floating trash Above 2 
Source: Green Korea 2004, Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
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APPENDIX E: PUBLIC SECTOR PAC EXPENDITURE 
Table E1. 
Pollution Abatement and Control (PAC) Expenditure: PUBLIC SECTOR 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
Year   
Waste 
water Waste Air Other TOTAL % Change
1993 Investment expenditure 10827 2566  24 72 13488 n/a
+ Internal current expenditure 2076 5696  204 437 8413 n/a
– Receipts from by-products .. 12  .. .. 12 
= Expenditure 1 12903 8250  228 509 21889 n/a
1994 Investment expenditure 11670 3038  44 127 14879 10.31%
+ Internal current expenditure 2827 6575  257 464 10123 20.32%
– Receipts from by-products .. 15  .. .. 15 
= Expenditure 1 14497 9598  301 590 24986 14.15%
1995 Investment expenditure 13393 3554  42 326 17315 16.38%
+ Internal current expenditure 3823 7395  262 560 12040 18.94%
– Receipts from by-products .. 75  .. .. 75 
= Expenditure 1 17216 10874  304 886 29280 17.19%
1996 Investment expenditure 14980 3703  91 287 19063 10.10%
+ Internal current expenditure 3969 8189  251 547 12958 7.62%
– Receipts from by-products .. 50  .. .. 50 
= Expenditure 1 18949 11843  343 834 31971 9.19%
1997 Investment expenditure 20503 3862  90 311 24767 29.92%
+ Internal current expenditure 4200 9162  246 565 14175 9.39%
– Receipts from by-products .. 50  .. .. 50 
= Expenditure 1 24703 12974  337 876 38892 21.65%
1998 Investment expenditure 15219 4613  96 253 20182 -18.51%
+ Internal current expenditure 3951 9211  238 548 13949 -1.59%
– Receipts from by-products .. 63  .. .. 63 
= Expenditure 1 19170 13760  334 802 34067 -12.41%
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Table E1. (cont.) 
Pollution Abatement and Control (PAC) Expenditure: PUBLIC SECTOR (cont.) 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
Year   
Waste 
water Waste Air Other TOTAL % Change
1999 Investment expenditure 17214 4919 88 230 22453 11.25%
+ Internal current expenditure 4178 10025 236 543 14984 7.42%
– Receipts from by-products .. 71 .. .. 71 
= Expenditure 1 21393 14872 325 774 37365 9.68%
2000 Investment expenditure 16427 2588 451 156 19623 -12.60%
+ Internal current expenditure 3938 10301 212 551 15003 0.13%
– Receipts from by-products .. 72 .. .. 72 
= Expenditure 1 20365 12816 663 708 34554 -7.52%
2001 Investment expenditure 17747 3452 220 226 21645 10.31%
+ Internal current expenditure 2964 10269 315 1225 14774 -1.52%
– Receipts from by-products .. 328 .. .. 328 
= Expenditure 1 20711 13393 535 1451 36091 4.45%
2002 Investment expenditure 18129 3474 67 214 21883 1.10%
+ Internal current expenditure 3276 10533 360 1414 15583 5.48%
– Receipts from by-products .. 333 .. .. 333 
= Expenditure 1 21406 13693 427 1628 37154 2.95%
2003 Investment expenditure 18479 4185 52 256 22972 4.98%
+ Internal current expenditure 3848 10766 478 1555 16648 6.83%
– Receipts from by-products .. 333 .. .. 333 
= Expenditure 1 22327 14618 530 1811 39286 5.74%
Source for 1993 – 1994, 2001 – 2003: Bank of Korea 
Source for 1995 – 2000: OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in OECD Countries. Paris, France: OECD, 2003.  
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Table E2. 
Annual Growth of PAC Expenditure, 1994 – 1997: PUBLIC SECTOR 
Year Waste water Waste Air Other Total 
1994 12.4% 16.4% 31.9% 16.0% 14.2%
1995 18.8% 13.3% 1.2% 50.1% 17.2%
1996 10.1% 8.9% 12.8% 5.9% 9.2%
1997 30.4% 9.6% -1.8% 5.0% 21.6%
Sub-Total 
(1993 – 1997) 91.5% 57.3% 48.0% 72.1% 77.7%
Annual 
Average 17.6% 12.0% 10.3% 14.5% 15.5%
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
 
 
 
Table E3. 
Annual Growth of PAC Expenditure, 1999 – 2003: PUBLIC SECTOR 
Year Waste water Waste Air Other Total 
1999 11.6% 8.1% -2.7% -3.5% 9.7%
2000 -4.8% -13.8% 104.0% -8.5% -7.5%
2001 1.7% 4.5% -19.3% 105.0% 4.5%
2002 3.4% 2.2% -20.2% 12.2% 3.0%
2003 4.3% 6.8% 24.1% 11.2% 5.7%
Sub-Total 
(1999 – 2003) 4.4% -1.7% 63.1% 134.0% 5.1%
Annual 
Average 1.1% -0.4% 13.0% 23.7% 1.3%
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
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APPENDIX F: BUSINESS SECTOR PAC EXPENDITURE 
Table F1. 
Pollution Abatement and Control (PAC) Expenditure: BUSINESS SECTOR 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
Year   
Waste 
water Waste Air Other TOTAL % Change
1993 Investment expenditure 2,500 1,461 3,782 547 8,290 n/a
+ Internal current expenditure 3,668 4,178  2,532 734 11,112 n/a
– Receipts from by-products .. ..  .. .. ..
= Expenditure 1 6,168 5.639  6,314 1,281 19,401 n/a
1994 Investment expenditure 3,386 2,057  4,528 1,269 11,240 35.6%
+ Internal current expenditure 4,326 5,066  3,105 724 13,221 19.0%
– Receipts from by-products .. ..  .. .. ..
= Expenditure 1 7,712 7,123  7,634 1,992 24,461 26.1%
1995 Investment expenditure 4,760 2,685  5,403 1,141 13,989 24.5%
+ Internal current expenditure 5,543 5,653  3,786 830 15,792 19.5%
– Receipts from by-products .. 117  .. .. 117
= Expenditure 1 10,303 8,221  9,169 1,971 29,664 21.3%
1996 Investment expenditure 5,285 3,336  5,097 1,060 14,779 5.7%
+ Internal current expenditure 5,912 6,533  4,128 840 17,414 10.3%
– Receipts from by-products .. 115  .. .. 115
= Expenditure 1 11,197 9,755  9,225 1,900 32,079 8.1%
1997 Investment expenditure 3,645 2,344  7,356 624 13,971 -5.5%
+ Internal current expenditure 5,981 7,408  4,462 878 18,730 7.6%
– Receipts from by-products .. 146  .. .. 146
= Expenditure 1 9,627 9,609  11,879 1502 32,555 1.5%
1998 Investment expenditure 2483 1564  4258 572 8878 -36.5%
+ Internal current expenditure 5353 6296  3993 819 16462 -12.1%
– Receipts from by-products .. 138  .. .. 138
= Expenditure 1 7836 7722  8251 1391 25201 -22.6%
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Table F1. (cont.) 
Pollution Abatement and Control (PAC) Expenditure: BUSINESS SECTOR (cont.) 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
Year   
Waste 
water Waste Air Other TOTAL % Change
1999 Investment expenditure 2,094 1,488 5,959 572 10,114 13.9%
+ Internal current expenditure 6,422 7,365 4,839 1,109 19,736 19.9%
– Receipts from by-products .. 171 .. .. 171
= Expenditure 1 8,516 8,682 10,798 1,682 29,680 17.8%
2000 Investment expenditure 2,189 1,833 3,652 554 8,230 -18.6%
+ Internal current expenditure 7,265 8,807 6,282 1,166 23,522 19.2%
– Receipts from by-products .. 190 .. .. 190
= Expenditure 1 9,455 10,450 9,935 1,727 31,562 6.3%
2001 Investment expenditure 4,497 1,056 6,103 487 12,143 47.5%
+ Internal current expenditure 6,457 3,176 7,887 1,019 18,539 -21.2%
– Receipts from by-products 88 2,512 167 22 2,789
= Expenditure 1 11,042 6,744 14,157 1,528 33,470 6.1%
2002 Investment expenditure 5,681 1,171 7,488 498 14,838 22.2%
+ Internal current expenditure 6,668 3,161 8,099 987 18,915 2.0%
– Receipts from by-products 102 2,843 279 55 3,219
= Expenditure 1 12,451 7,175 15,806 ,1540 36,972 10.5%
2003 Investment expenditure 5,060 1,247 7,615 612 14,534 -2.1%
+ Internal current expenditure 6,729 4,267 8,026 1,090 20,112 6.3%
– Receipts from by-products 113 3,774 232 36 4,156
= Expenditure 1 11,902 9,288 15,874 1,737 38,802 5.0%
Source for 1993 – 1994, 2001 – 2003: Bank of Korea 
Source for 1995 – 2000: OECD. Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure in OECD Countries. Paris, France: OECD, 2003.  
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Table F2. 
Annual Growth of PAC Expenditure, 1994 – 1997: BUSINESS SECTOR 
Year Waste water Waste Air Other Total 
1994 25.0% 26.3% 19.7% 132% 35.6%
1995 33.6% 15.4% 20.1% -1.1% 21.3%
1996 837% 18.7% 0.6% -3.6% 8.14%
1997 -14.0% -1.5% 28.1% -21.0% 1.5%
Sub-Total 
(1993 – 1997) 56.1% 70.4% 87.2% 17.3% 67.8%
Annual 
Average 11.8% 14.3% 17.0% 4.1% 13.8%
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
 
 
 
Table F3. 
Annual Growth of PAC Expenditure, 1999 – 2003: BUSINESS SECTOR 
Year Waste water Waste Air Other Total 
1999 8.7% 12.4% 30.9% 20.9% 17.8%
2000 11.0% 20.4% -8.0% 2.3% 6.3%
2001 16.8% -35.5% 42.5% -11.2% 6.1%
2002 12.8% 6.4% 11.7% 0.8% 10.5%
2003 -4.4% 29.5% 0.4% 12.8% 5.0%
Sub-Total 
(1999 – 2003) 39.8% 70.4% 47.0% 3.3% 30.7%
Annual 
Average 8.7% 7.0% 10.1% 0.8% 6.9%
Source: OECD; Bank of Korea 
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APPENDIX G: BUDGET DATA 
Table G1. 
Environmental Budget: South Korea 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
MOE Budget 1,887 4,716 6,729 8,851 10,802 11,131 11,536 13,023 14,143 14,336 14,036
Allowance for 
Water Quality 
Improvement 
2,500 2,490 3,121 3,978 6,867 6,132 6,714 9,317 12,250 14,293 15,837
Total 
(Environmental 
Budget) 
4,387 7,206 9,850 12,829 17,669 17,263 18,250 22,340 26,393 28,629 29,873
Source: Ministry of Environment, Republic of Korea 
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Table G2. 
Korea Government General Account: 1993 - 2004 
Unit: 100 million Korean won (1995) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
(1) Nat'l Defense Expenditures 101,681 105,818 113,676 123,373 124,593 120,205
(2) Education Expenditures 82,130 86,107 97,380 105,121 110,125 102,966
(3) Social Development 37,933 40,325 41,632 47,854 53,834 61,147
(4) Economic Development 85,447 103,178 115,069 125,069 148,576 188,354
(5) General Administration 49,456 49,741 54,530 59,875 62,253 62,002
(6) Grants to Local Government 48,491 49,839 54,842 60,784 62,042 59,748
(7) Repayment of Debt & Others 3,696 3,420 10,256 3,453 3,722 4,482
(8) Other Expenditures 4,942 8,697 27,595 31,828 18,542 22,629
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
(1) Nat'l Defense Expenditures 117,159 124,172 127,942 133,962 136,471 143,222
(2) Education Expenditures 96,132 104,163 141,370 144,173 154,347 159,548
(3) Social Development 77,461 86,865 107,646 106,603 111,769 115,969
(4) Economic Development 197,846 190,551 201,692 246,334 225,752 213,320
(5) General Administration 65,768 66,845 72,710 78,058 93,700 82,304
(6) Grants to Local Government 56,500 68,020 97,226 94,384 111,130 102,472
(7) Repayment of Debt & Others 14,585 38,890 32,045 35,042 43,168 36,919
(8) Other Expenditures 52,390 51,092 11,210 16,648 4,111 2,779
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget, Republic of Korea 
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